The six parties agree that experts from those countries will be involved in visits to nuclear facilities, the review of documents related to North Korea’s nuclear program, and the interview of technical personnel. The Koreas in December 2007 began freight services between South Korea’s Munsan Station in Paju and the North’s Panmun Station to support operations at a now-shuttered joint factory park in Kaesong. The line was cut in November 2008 due to political tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program and the hard-line policies of a new. Joint statement following Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, as released by the People's Republic of China. Of the Joint Statement. 13 February 2007 The Third Session of. North Korea's nuclear program with David Sanger of The New York Times. Qatar and the Middle East, with Yousef Al Oitaba, the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to the U.S., and Mike Morell, the former deputy director of the C.I.A. North Korea sits between China and South Korea. China has conflicted desires - not wanting a united Korean peninsula, not wanting a nuclear DPRK, and not wanting regime change that would flood.

Missile defense systems are a type of missile defense intended to shield a country against incoming missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) or other ballistic missiles. The United States, Russia,Iran,Taiwan, India, France, Israel and China have all developed missile defense systems. ^[1]

• 3India
• 9Other developments

Definitions[edit]

• The term 'Missile defense system' broadly means a system that provides any defense against any missile type (conventional or nuclear) by any country.
• Any mechanism which can detect and then destroy a missile before it can cause any harm is called a missile defence system (MDS).^[2]

The role of defense against nuclear missiles has been a heated military and political topic for several decades. However, missile defense is no longer limited to interception of strategic nuclear weapons. The gradual development and proliferation of missile technology has blurred the line between the technologies for the interception of tactical missiles (usually short to intermediate range with non-nuclear payloads) and the interception of strategic missiles (usually long ranged with nuclear payloads). High-performance tactical ballistic missiles carrying non-nuclear payloads now have the ability to affect strategic balance in conflict zones. Likewise, high-performance tactical missile defense systems can now influence force deployment strategies.

France, Italy, and UK[edit]

The UK, France and Italy developed a programme called PAAMS (Sea Viper in UK). It was developed to arm the Horizon-class frigate (which was a joint programme by the UK, France and Italy) with the best anti-aircraft missile system in the world. Then the UK dropped out of the frigate programme and instead decided to design and build its own Type 45 destroyer which would still use the PAAMS missile system. France and Italy then decided they wanted to extend the programme to include a ground-launched anti-ballistic missile system. France and Italy then developed SAMPT - a truck-launched anti-ballistic missile system which used PAAMS technology.

India[edit]

Two systems are in planning and Testing stages. Air defence network has two principal components - the ‘Air Defence Ground Environment System’ (ADGES) and the ‘Base Air Defence Zones’ (BADZ). The ADGES network provides for wide area radar coverage and permits the detection and interception of most aerial incursions into Indian airspace. The BADZ system is far more concentrated with radars, interceptors, SAMs and AAA units working in conjunction to provide an intense and highly effective defensive barrier to attacks on vital targets.^[4]

Ballistic missile defence[edit]

The Ballistic Missile Defence Program is an initiative to develop and deploy a multi-layered ballistic missile defense system to protect India from ballistic missile attacks.^[5][6]

Introduced in light of the ballistic missile threat from Pakistan,^[7] it is a double-tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high-altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept an incoming missile having a range of up to 5,000 kilometers.^[8]

PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an Anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia and Israel.^[9] On 6 March 2009, India again successfully tested its missile defense shield, during which a test 'enemy' missile was intercepted at an altitude of 75 km.^[10]

On 6 May 2012, it was announced that Phase-I is complete and can be deployed to protect two Indian cities at a short notice.^[11][12]New Delhi, the national capital, and Mumbai, have been selected for the ballistic missile defence shield.^[13] After successful implementation in Delhi and Mumbai, the system will be used to cover other major cities in the country.^[14] This shield can destroy incoming ballistic missiles with range up to 2,000 km. When the Phase II is completed and PDV is developed, the two anti-ballistic missiles can intercept targets up to range 5,000 km both at exo and endo-atmospheric (inside the atmosphere) regions.^[15][16]

Apart from DRDO's endeavour to develop a potent missile defense, India is reportedly examining the Israeli Arrow, the Almaz design bureau's S-300 PMU-1/-2 and S-400 and the Antey design bureau's Antey 2500/S-300VM.^[4] India has procured a squadron of S-300V systems which are in use as an 'anti-tactical ballistic missile screen'.^[17][18]

India also purchased S-400 system from Russia for 5.4 Billion dollars in 2018.^[19]

Cruise missile defence[edit]

Defending against an attack by a cruise missile on the other hand is similar to tackling low-flying manned aircraft and hence most methods of aircraft defence can be used for a cruise missile defence system.^[2]

In order to ward off the threats of nuke-tipped cruise missile attack India has a new missile defence programme which will be focused solely on intercepting cruise missiles. The technological breakthrough has been created with an Advanced Air Defence missile (AAD).^[20]DRDO Chief, Dr V K Saraswat stated in an Interview 'Our studies have indicated that this AAD will be able to handle a cruise missile intercept,'^[20]

Furthermore, India is acquiring airborne radars like AWACS to ensure detection of cruise missiles in order to stay on top of the threat.^[20]

Barak-8 is a long-range anti-air and anti-missile naval defence system being developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India. The Indian Army is considering induction of a variant of Barak 8 missile to meet its requirement for a medium-range surface-to-air air defence missile. The naval version of this missile will have the capability to intercept incoming enemy cruise missiles and combat jets targeting its warships at sea.^[21] India has a joint venture for this missile with Israel.^[22]

On 17 November 2010, in an interview Rafael's Vice President Mr. Lova Drori confirmed that the David's Sling system has been offered to the Indian Armed Forces.^[23]

Israel[edit]

Israel has a national missile defense against short- to long-range missiles using their Arrow missile system. The Arrow or Hetz (Hebrew: חֵץ, pronounced [ˈχet͡s]) is a family of anti-ballistic missiles designed to fulfill an Israeli requirement for a theater missile defense system. Jointly funded and produced by Israel and the United States,^{[Note 1]} development of the system began in 1986 and has continued since, drawing some contested criticism.^{[citation needed]} Undertaken by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Boeing, it is overseen by the Israeli Ministry of Defense's 'Homa' (Hebrew: חומה‎, pronounced [χoma], 'rampart') administration and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

The Arrow system consists of the joint production hypersonic Arrow anti-missile interceptor, the EltaEL/M-2080 'Green Pine' early-warningAESAradar, the Tadiran Telecom 'Golden Citron' ('Citron Tree') C³I center, and the Israel Aerospace Industries 'Brown Hazelnut' ('Hazelnut Tree') launch control center. The system is transportable, as it can be moved to other prepared sites.

Following the construction and testing of the Arrow 1 technology demonstrator, production and deployment began with the Arrow 2 version of the missile. The Arrow is considered one of the most advanced missile defense programs currently in existence.^[24][25]

It is the first operational missile defense system specifically designed and built to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles.^[27][28] The first Arrow battery was declared fully operational in October 2000. Although several of its components have been exported, the Israeli Air Defense Command within the Israeli Air Force (IAF) of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is currently the sole user of the complete Arrow system. Arrow 3 was declared operational on Wednesday, 18 January 2017.^[29]

Apart from Arrow missile, Israel has Iron dome which is designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells fired from distances of 4 to 70 kilometers away^[30] and David's Sling^{[Note 2]} that is designed to intercept medium- to long-range rockets and cruise missiles, such as those possessed by Hezbollah, fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km.^[23]Iron Beam is a directed high energy laser (HEL) which during its prototype tests has shot down aerial targets at distances up to the 4 kilometer range.^[31]

Russia[edit]

The Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system is currently operational only around the city of Moscow, the national capital, and is being augmented to protect major cities in Russia. The A-135anti-ballistic missile system is a Russian military complex deployed around Moscow to counter enemy missiles targeting the city or its surrounding areas. It became operational during 1995. It is a successor to the previous A-35, and compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from which the US unilaterally withdrew in 2002.^[32]

The A-135 system attained 'alert' (operational) status on 17 February 1995. It is currently operational although its 53T6 (NATO:SH-11) component is deactivated (as of February 2007). A newer missile is expected to replace it. There is an operational test version of the system at the test site in Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.

The S-300PMU1 and PMU2 can intercept SRBMs, and the S-300V and S-400 Triumf systems are capable of intercepting a multiple IRBM attack by all DF-21 model IRBMs.^[32] These air-defense systems have been purchased by Turkey, India, China, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Other countries which have also expressed interest include Iran and Belarus.

The enhanced S-300VM/VMK is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 2,500 km re-entry speeds of 4.5 km/s, whereas the S-400 is claimed to be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500 km which equates to re-entry speeds of 4.8 to 5 km/s. A system designed to intercept warheads at 5 km/s has the ability to act as a point system against simple ICBM warheads which have a typical re-entry speed of 7 km/s.^[32] Apart from the main Moscow deployment, Russia has striven actively for intrinsic ABM capabilities of its late model SAM systems. Russian ground based theatre defence against ballistic and cruise missiles are centered on the in-service

• S-300P (SA-10)
• S-300V (SA-12A/B Giant/Gladiator)
• S-300PMU-1/2 (SA-20A/B Gargoyle)
• S-400 (SA-21)
• S-500 (In development)

United States[edit]

The U.S. Sentinel program was a planned national missile defense during the 1970s, but was never deployed. Elements of Sentinel were actually deployed briefly as the Safeguard Program, although it was not national in scope.United States has had in development a nationwide antimissile program since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now refers to the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated facilities.

Other elements yet to be integrated into NMD (National Missile Defense) may include anti-ballistic missiles, or sea-based, space-based, laser, and high-altitude missile systems. The NMD program is limited in scope and designed to counter a relatively small ICBM attack from a less sophisticated adversary. Unlike the earlier Strategic Defense Initiative program, it is not designed to be a robust shield against a large attack from a technically sophisticated adversary.^[33]

As of 2012, this system is operational with limited capability. In early April 2013, the Pentagon announced plans to deploy 14 more missile interceptors (GBIs) to Alaska in response to the North Korean threats to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States.^[34] A THAAD battery was deployed to Guam as well.^[35]

China[edit]

China tested the FJ ABM in the Cold War but they were ultimately cancelled. The PLA has currently developed the KT series of anti ballistic missiles and also have adopted limited anti ballistic capabilities on the HQ-9, KS series, and HQ-16.

China successfully tested its exoatmospheric interception capabilities in a test in 2010 and also in a test in 2013, being the second of two countries able to do so. The anti missile technology is successful to this day. The BMD system was again tested on 8 September 2017 and was deemed successful.

Four versions of the S-300 are in service, the PMU, PMU1 and PMU2 and the navalised S-300FM Rif. Based on the S-300PMU1, the Rif equips the PLAN’s two Type 51C Luzhou air-defence destroyers enabling them to contribute to the protection of a coastal site against SRBM attack.^[32]

The S-300PMU2 has the best chance of intercepting an SRBM missile as it employs the 48N6E2 missile which has a warhead optimised for destroying ballistic missiles, and better kinematics compared to earlier 48N6 missiles.^[32]

HQ-9 may have some ABM capability.^{[Note 3][32]}

However, it might be noted that on 11 January 2007 the Chinese successfully performed an anti-satellite missile test^[36] using a KT-1^{[Note 4]} missile with a Kinetic Kill Vehicle mounted.^[32]Download aiag fmea manual free.

New missiles, the HQ-19, HQ-26, and HQ-29, are being built.^[37]

Taiwan[edit]

Taiwan operates the Sky Bow family of BMD systems.^[38] Development of Sky Bow I began in 1981 with deployment beginning in 1993. The Sky Bow II is an improved version of the Sky Bow I. Both the Sky Bow I and Sky Bow II use a common silo launch system.

In 2001 development of the completely new Sky Bow III system began with flight testing commencing in 2009 and deployment soon after. The Sky Bow III has a top speed of Mach 7.^[39] A naval variant of the Sky Bow III has also been developed.^[40]

In addition to the BMD force the Army operates the Antelope air defence system which has a significant anti-cruise missile capability.^[41] Sea princess abc2 games. The ROCAF also operates imported Patriot PAC-3 batteries.

Other developments[edit]

Japan[edit]

In 2018, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF), initiated their 54th year of Hawk system and missile training at Fort Bliss.^[42]In 2016, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), and also the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF), initiated their 52nd year^[43] of annual live-fire missile launches at McGregor Range, New Mexico in Fort Bliss.^[44] The 2014 annual service practice of the PAC-3 Patriot missile demonstrated a 100 percent kill rate before a group which included the commanding generals of White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), and of the 32nd Army Air & Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). Every JASDF Patriot team participated in the annual exercise, which takes several months.^[45]

Since 1998, when North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan, the Japanese have been jointly developing a new surface-to-air interceptor known as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) with the US. So far tests have been successful, and there are planned 11 locations that the PAC-3 will be installed. A military spokesman^[46] said that tests had been done on two sites, one of them a business park in central Tokyo, and Ichigaya – a site not far from the Imperial Palace.Along with the PAC-3, Japan has installed the US-developed Aegis ship-based anti-ballistic missile system, which was tested successfully on 18 December 2007. The missile was launched from a Japanese warship, in partnership with the US Missile Defense Agency and destroyed a mock target launched from the coast.

Japan is in consultations with the United States to possibly deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and a ground-based version of the Standard Missile-3 interceptors mounted on Aegis destroyers. In a joint US-Japan test of Standard Missile-3 Block IIa, a medium-range ballistic missile was successfully intercepted on 3 February 2017.^[47][48] Japan's intention is to create a four-stage anti-missile shield.^[49]

South Korea[edit]

Like the UAE (see below), South Korea has agreed to deploy THAAD systems.^[50] The agreement was announced in July 2016.^[51]

Because a kinetic-kill defense such as THAAD destroys high-value incoming missiles by colliding with them, the missile system is defensive, and not for offense. The agreement came after a North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missile launch in June 2016; China has rebuked the actions of the involved parties,^[52] as destabilizing. South Korean military sources responded that a 12 February 2017 launch by North Korea represented a new technology, a 'cold launch' using compressed gas before the solid-fuel rocket ignition.^[53] This type of launch is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology.^[53] China responded to the North Korean launch by cutting off their import of North Korean coal, which is 50% of North Korea's income.^[54][55] On 6 March 2017, North Korea launched four missiles from Tongchang-ri,^[56] a known long-range missile site at 7:36 a.m. local time, one of which landed in the Sea of Japan, with the remaining three missiles landing in Japan's economic zone.^[57] A fifth North Korean missile failed to launch.^[58]

That day, the first vehicles of a THAAD battery deployed to South Korea. Two launcher trucks arrived at Osan Air Base, South Korea, on 6 March 2017.^[58][59] By 6 September 2017 the AN/TPY-2 radar, the fire control system, and all six launchers (with 48 THAAD interceptors) were fully deployed.^[60]

United Arab Emirates[edit]

United Arab Emirates (UAE) has graduated its first two American Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) unit classes at Fort Bliss in 2015, and in 2016.^[61] Its first live-fire exercises with Patriot missiles took place in 2014. The UAE is 'the first GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) partner to possess an upper tier ballistic missile defense capability the THAAD weapon system,' stated the US Army general who addressed this graduating class.^[62]

Criticism[edit]

Bruno Gruselle, in 2010, noted that French policy makers considered the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the doctrine of Mutual assured destruction to be the cornerstones of strategic stability.^[63] Some French analysts, notably Camille Grand,^[64] view missile defense as jeopardizing both the doctrine and the Treaty, as well as risking a new arms race,^[63] which is reflected in the development of advanced missile defense counter measures and decoys as well as a higher number of and more maneuverable independently targetable reentry vehicles^[65] - as well as the intercept systems designed to defeat them.

Additionally experts question the accuracy and reliability of these systems.^[66] Beyond the technical difficulties, which have been described as more challenging than hitting one bullet with another all performance data is derived from experiments and scripted tests. Their effectivity in an actual all-out war situation is uncertain.^[2] However, non-nuclear ballistic and conventional missiles have been used in recent limited regional conflicts to strategic effect. Several Houthi-fired ballistic missiles in Yemen have been intercepted by Saudi Patriot batteries, and Russian cruise missiles have been notably used in the current Syrian conflict.

Gruselle noted most French security experts doubted the technological feasibility of intercontinental ballistic missile defense. Some thought it foolish to spend huge amounts of money on unproven technologies that lacked operational or political usefulness. Instead, the French defense policy community viewed missile defense merely as an American 'economic weapon' used to defeat the Soviet Union and win the Cold War.^[67]

The extant missile defenses are currently vulnerable to maneuverable hypersonic vehicles, which can maneuver at speeds high enough to defeat missile defenses. China is among the countries pursuing hypersonic vehicles as warhead delivery systems.^[68]

Yousaf Butt, a critic of missile defense, states in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that 'just as with nuclear weapons, the U.S. infatuation with missile defense will cause other nations to desire this expensive technology'.^[69]

Russia's top military officer has threatened to carry out a pre-emptive strike on U.S.-led NATO missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe if Washington goes ahead with its controversial plan to build a missile shield.^[70] Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov also warned that talks between Moscow and Washington on the topic are 'close to a dead end.'^[70] U.S. State Department special envoy Ellen Tauscher responded that neither country can afford another arms race.^[70]

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

1. ^Dr. Uzi Rubin: 'The Arrow program used practically no U.S. technology, just U.S. money. It was almost entirely based on Israeli technology, though we bought some components in the U.S. because they were cheaper.' (2003) —source
2. ^[http://www.waaytv.com/redstone_alabama/missile-defense-agency-and-israel-conduct-successful-test-of-david/article_0eedb1b2-e324-11e6-8a7b-37eb6ddc3e63.html The 5th system-level test
   • April 2017: David's Sling system expected to be operational accessdate=2017-03-20]^{[permanent dead link]}
3. ^However, it is kinematically inferior to the imported Russian S-300PMU2 Favorit according to this source
4. ^described by the director of United States Defense Intelligence Agency as a SC-19 missile

References[edit]

1. ^'Demonstration of integrated missile air defense system by June next year: Dr VK Saraswat'. domain-b.com. 10 December 2007. Retrieved 21 November 2010.
2. ^ ^abc'India 7th nation with ICBM technology'. Indian times. 23 April 2012. Retrieved 8 August 2012.
3. ^'HMS Diamond fires Sea Viper missile for first time - Announcements - Inside Government'. GOV.UK. 1 May 2012. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
4. ^ ^ab'Ballistic Missile Defence for India'. Bharat Rakshak. Retrieved 22 August 2012.
5. ^Pollack, Andrew. 'India expects to use missile interception system as a weapon, top scientist says'. International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
6. ^'India developing new missiles Towards destroying hostile missiles'. Hindu.com. 3 December 2006. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
7. ^The New GuardianArchived 2 February 2008 at the Wayback MachineIndia unveils an all new anti-ballistic missile expected to be the fore-runner of a sophisticated air defence system to thwart, among other threats, a Pakistani nuclear weapons attack
8. ^'India tests interceptor missile'. Google.com. 6 March 2009. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
9. ^'Development of Ballistic Missile Defence System: Year End Review' (Press release). Ministry of Defence (India). 28 December 2007. Retrieved 26 January 2008.
10. ^Pollack, Andrew. 'India successfully tests missile interceptor'. International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
11. ^Rajat Pandit, TNN, 26 November 2007, 02:43AM IST (26 November 2007). 'India on way to joining exclusive BMD club'. Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 19 April 2013.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
12. ^PTI (6 May 2012). 'Missile defence shield ready: DRDO chief'. Thehindu.com. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
13. ^'Delhi, Mumbai selected for ballistic missile defence shield'. The Times Of India. 24 June 2012.
14. ^'Delhi, Mumbai to get missile defence shield - NDTV News'. Ndtv.com. 24 June 2012. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
15. ^'More Teeth to Defence System'. IBNLive. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
16. ^PTI (24 June 2012). 'Delhi, Mumbai to be first provided with missile defence shield'. Economictimes.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
17. ^'Strategic Air Defences in a Nuclear South-Asia'. Bharat-Rakshak. 2 July 2009. Retrieved 22 August 2012.
18. ^'India To Boost Airfield Defenses'. DefenceNews. Retrieved 22 August 2012.
19. ^'India signs $5.4-billion deal to buy 5 S-400 missile systems from Russia'. www.businesstoday.in. Retrieved 7 March 2019.
20. ^ ^abc'India discovers methods to face missile wars'. IBNLive. 16 December 2007. Retrieved 8 August 2012.
21. ^'February trial for naval air defence missile'. Indo-Asian News service. 16 November 2011. Archived from the original on 14 June 2015. Retrieved 8 August 2012.
22. ^'Naval Barak-8 Missiles, Israel, India'. Naval Technology. Retrieved 8 August 2012.
23. ^ ^ab'Rafael Confirms Offer of Iron Dome, David's Sling to Indian Armed Forces'. India-defence.com. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
24. ^'Missile defense systems: Arrow'. Claremont InstituteMissileThreat.com. Archived from the original on 14 October 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
25. ^'The Arrow missile program'. Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved 21 August 2009.
26. ^'Israel, U.S. to embark on collaborative 'upper-tier' missile intercept program to include Arrow 3 and land-based SM-3 missiles'. Defense Update. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
27. ^'Israel profile: missile overview: Arrow anti-ballistic missile defense system'. Nuclear Threat Initiative. October 2008. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
28. ^'U.S.–Israel missile defense cooperation'(PDF). American Israel Public Affairs Committee. 21 December 2006. Retrieved 4 August 2011.
29. ^Israel deploys 'Star Wars' missile killer system
30. ^Sharp, Jeremy M. (16 September 2010). 'U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel'Archived 31 July 2015 at the Wayback Machine. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
31. ^Israeli Army IDF expects to deploy new Rafael Iron Beam laser air defense system this year
32. ^ ^abcdefg'China's Cruise and Ballistic Missile Defence'. A Strategic Assessment of PLA Theatre Missile and ASAT Capabilities. Air Power Australia. Retrieved 6 August 2012.
33. ^http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Volume6/Issue4/pdf/05riem.pdf
34. ^'The Ultimate North Korean Missile Threat To America: A Nuke Power Grid Attack'. Forbes. 18 April 2012. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
35. ^Stewart, Phil. 'U.S. to send missile defenses to Guam over North Korea threat'. Reuters. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
36. ^'World fury at satellite destruction'. Theage.com.au. 19 January 2007. Retrieved 19 April 2013.
37. ^http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/hq-19.htm
38. ^'Tien-Kung (Sky Bow)'. missiledefenseadvocacy.org. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. Retrieved 19 April 2019.
39. ^[1]
40. ^'Taiwan's NCSIST Successfully Tested a Ship-based Variant of Tien Kung III BMD Interceptor'. navyrecognition.com. Navy Recognition. Retrieved 19 April 2019.
41. ^'The Antelope'. missiledefenseadvocacy.org. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. Retrieved 19 April 2019.
42. ^Laven2 (31 October 2018) Japanese test fire Ground self-defense forces successfully fire Hawk missiles at McGregor range
43. ^Air defenders share knowledge of the Patriot system, missile training accessdate=2016-11-18
44. ^Japanese conduct joint live-fire exercises at McGregor
45. ^Fort Bliss Bugle (16 Oct 2014) p.12A JASDF 50th year of live-fire missile exercisesArchived 2 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine
46. ^'Japan plans Tokyo missile shield'. BBC News. 15 January 2008.
47. ^US-Japan military successfully intercept a ballistic missile target with SM-3 Block IIA
48. ^'Success! U.S., Japan conduct intercept test'. Ho'okele. 10 February 2017. Retrieved 8 January 2019.
49. ^'Defense Ministry to study new missile defense systems'. The Japan Times. 21 June 2014.
    • As N. Korea fires missiles, some in Japan want the ability to launch strikes accessdate=2017-03-27
50. ^South Korea, U.S. agree to deploy THAAD missile defense to counter North Korea threat (7 July 2016)
51. ^S.Korea, U.S. Officially Start THAAD Talks (10 July 2016)
52. ^S.Korea, U.S. to deploy THAAD missile defence, drawing China rebuke (7 July 2016)
53. ^ ^abReuters World News (12 Feb 2017) 'South Korea says North Korea missile used 'cold eject' launch system' accessdate=2017-02-19
54. ^Bloomberg Politics (18 Feb 2017) 'China's Message to Trump With North Korea Coal Ban: Let's Deal' accessdate=2017-02-19
55. ^PM Abe: North Korea launched four ballistic missiles .nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/asia/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test-kim-jong-un.html Choe Sang-Hun, (1 Jan 2017) 'North Korea Will Test Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, Kim Says' New York Times^{[permanent dead link]}
56. ^PM Abe: North Korea launched four ballistic missiles accessdate=2017-03-05
57. ^Washington Post North Korea launches another missile, perhaps one that can reach U.S. A fifth North Korean missile failed its launch.
    • North Korea fires four ballistic missiles into Sea of Japan, PM Abe says accessdate=2017-03-05
    • More detail on the launch of 4 North Korean missiles accessdate=2017-03-06
58. ^ ^abU.S. Begins Shipping Controversial Anti-Missile System to South Korea accessdate=2017-03-06
59. ^THAAD arrives on the Korean Peninsula accessdate=2017-03-06
60. ^Reuters: (6 September 2017) South Korea deploys anti-missile system as U.S. seeks tough North Korea sanctions
61. ^UAE graduates second class of THAAD air defenders
62. ^UAE air defenders graduate THAAD course, make BMD history accessdate=2016-01-07
63. ^ ^ab'.. Missile defense would become a reality and that systems would eventually be deployed. Paris realized that it needed to adjust policy to these realities to avoid risking the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent. ' Nonetheless, Gruselle concedes in the same work that 'Paris realized that it needed to adjust policy to these realities to avoid risking the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent.', as well as the fact that 'France recognized the necessity of missile defense to protect deployed French troops.' That is to say, French policy makers realized that the increasing performance and reliability of missile defense systems could reduce its own nuclear deterrence, and was also necessary to maintain its foreign military deploymentBruno Gruselle (Nov 2010) 'Missile Defense in NATO: a French Perspective' Lisbon NATO Summit, Nov 2010
64. ^Camille Grand, Director, FRS; Chair, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
65. ^'Prepared Statement by Dr. Christopher Yeaw, Director, Center for Assurance, Deterrence, Escalation, and Nonproliferation Science & Education at the Louisiana Tech Research Institute, Before The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China's Offensive Missile Forces Wednesday, April 1st, 2015'(PDF). Archived from the original(PDF) on 20 October 2015. Retrieved 30 April 2015.
66. ^See for example, the reporting from the Los Angeles Times 5 April 2015
67. ^Bruno Gruselle (2010) 'Missile Defense in NATO: A French Perspective'
68. ^'Hypersonic arms race: China tests high-speed missile to beat U.S. defenses'. 13 January 2014.
69. ^05/08/2010 - 07:49 'The myth of missile defense as a deterrent'
70. ^ ^abcCraggs, Ryan (3 May 2012). 'Russia Threatens Pre-Emptive Strike On NATO Missile Defense Shields'. Huffington post. Retrieved 6 August 2012.

External links[edit]

• The Center for Defense Information has many resources on ABMs and NMD.
• The Federation of American Scientists A resource for technical data, full-text of key documents, and analysis.
• MissileThreat.com, a listing and descriptions of ABM systems around the world.
• The unofficial website of the Stanley R. Mickelson Safeguard complex contains relevant images and history of the Safeguard program.

Korea S Nuclear Program 2007 Sienna Plantation

Last Updated: October, 2018

North Korea (aka the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) is the only country to have withdrawn from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to pursue a nuclear weapons program, and possesses an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The DPRK remains outside of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has repeatedly violated the international norm against nuclear testing by conducting tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, two tests in 2016, and a test in 2017. North Korea claimed its sixth nuclear test, in September 2017, was of a thermonuclear device. [1] The United Nations Security Council has passed numerous resolutions condemning North Korea’s nuclear activities, and has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on the North Korean military and economy.

International efforts to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, which had been stalled since the discontinuation of the Six Party Talks in 2009, were rekindled in early 2018. A diplomatic thaw on the Korean Peninsula led to direct talks between the heads of state of the two Koreas, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in, on 27 April 2018, followed by the 12 June 2018 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore. Although North Korea affirmed its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at both summits, there has been little tangible progress towards denuclearization.

Click to take a virtual tour of North Korea’s nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri.

History

1950s to 1960s: Early Developments

North Korea began its nuclear program in the early 1950s. In December 1952, the government established the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Academy of Sciences, but nuclear work only began to progress when North Korea established cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union. [2] Pyongyang signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and began to send scientists and technicians to the USSR for training shortly thereafter. In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for Soviet help to establish a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province. [3]

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive technical assistance to North Korea in constructing the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor and associated facilities. North Korea used this small research reactor to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. [4] Although the cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities, then-North Korean leader Kim Il Sung retained ultimate control of the nuclear program and all decisions associated with weapons development.

Although bolstered by early assistance from Moscow, and to some extent Beijing, North Korea's nuclear program developed largely without significant foreign assistance. Reportedly, Kim Il Sung asked Beijing to share its nuclear weapons technology following China's first nuclear test in October 1964, but Chinese leader Mao Zedong refused. [5] Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate.

1970s to 1993: Indigenous Development under the Radar of the International Community

In the late 1960s, North Korea expanded its educational and research institutions to support a nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean engineers were using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 research reactor, and Pyongyang had begun to acquire plutoniumreprocessing technology from the Soviet Union. [6] In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical assembly in Yongbyon under IAEA safeguards. The Soviets were included in the agreement because they supplied the reactor's fuel. [7]

The early 1980s was a period of significant indigenous expansion, when North Korea constructed uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, as well as research and development institutions. Simultaneously, North Korea began experimenting with the high explosives tests required for building the triggering mechanism of a nuclear bomb. By the mid-1980s, the country had begun constructing a 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, while also expanding its uranium processing facilities. [8]

The DPRK also explored the acquisition of light water reactor (LWR) technology in the early to mid-1980s. This period coincided with the expansion of North Korea's indigenously designed reactor program, which was based on gas-graphite-moderated reactors similar in design to the Calder Hall reactors first built in the United Kingdom in the 1950s. North Korea agreed to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in December 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance constructing four LWRs. [9]

In September 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons. [10] North Korea and South Korea then signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, whereby both sides promised they would 'not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.' The agreement additionally bound the two sides to forgo the possession of 'nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.' The agreement also provided for a bilateral inspections regime, but the two sides failed to agree on its implementation. [11]

The 1994 Crisis and the Agreed Framework

North Korea signed an IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement on 9 April 1992. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an initial declaration of its nuclear facilities and materials, and provided access for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of its declaration. [12] Six rounds of inspections began in May 1992 and concluded in February 1993. Pyongyang's initial declaration included a small plutonium sample (less than 100 grams), which North Korean officials said was reprocessed from damaged spent fuel rods that were removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. However, IAEA analysis indicated that Korean technicians had reprocessed plutonium on three occasions—in 1989, 1990, and 1991. [13] When the Agency requested access to two suspected nuclear waste sites, North Korea declared them to be military sites and therefore off-limits. [14]

After the IAEA was denied access to North Korea's suspected waste sites in early 1993, the Agency asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorize special ad hoc inspections. In reaction, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993. [15] Under the terms of the treaty, a state's withdrawal does not take effect until 90 days after it has given notice. Following intense bilateral negotiations with the United States, North Korea announced it was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT one day before the withdrawal was to take effect. Pyongyang agreed to suspend its withdrawal while talks continued with Washington, but claimed to have a special status in regard to its nuclear safeguards commitments. Under this special status, North Korea agreed to allow the continuity of safeguards on its present activities, but refused to allow inspections that could verify past nuclear activities. [16]

As talks with the United States over North Korea's return to the NPT dragged on, North Korea continued to operate its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon. On 14 May 1994, Korean technicians began removing the reactor's spent fuel rods without the supervision of IAEA inspectors. [17] This action worsened the crisis because the random placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond compromised the IAEA's capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which could have been used in efforts to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang's reported plutonium reprocessing. [18] U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration announced that it would ask the UNSC to impose economic sanctions; Pyongyang responded that it would consider economic sanctions 'an act of war.' [19]

The crisis was defused in June 1994 when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il Sung. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of a deal that was later finalized as the Agreed Framework in October 1994. [20] Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze work at its gas-graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, and to allow the IAEA to monitor that freeze. Pyongyang was also required to 'consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' and to remain a party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target date of 2003. Furthermore, the United States was to provide 'formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.' [21]

2001 to 2003: Collapse of the Agreed Framework and Withdrawal from the NPT

While the Agreed Framework froze North Korea's plutonium program for almost a decade, neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation. The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to verify the DPRK’s past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the light water power reactors.

In 2001, the new George W. Bush administration initiated a North Korean policy review, which it completed in early June. The review concluded that the United States should seek 'improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture.' [22] From Washington's perspective, 'improved implementation of the Agreed Framework' meant an acceleration of safeguards inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit to full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant portion of the reactor construction was completed, but before the delivery of critical reactor components.

The international community also became concerned that North Korea might have an illicit highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. In summer 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of HEU technology and/or materials transfers from Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology. [23] (Later, in early 2004, it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan had sold gas-centrifuge technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran.) [24] Around this time, North Korea began construction of the covert uranium enrichment facility at Kangson in the outskirts of Pyongyang. Although U.S. intelligence was reportedly aware of the site, its existence was only revealed to the public in July 2018 through the efforts of open-source analysts. [25]

In October 2002, bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea finally resumed when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang. [26] During the visit, Kelly informed First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington was aware of a secret North Korean program to produce HEU. The U.S. State Department stated that North Korean officials admitted to having such a program during a second day of meetings with Kelly, but North Korea later argued that it had only admitted to having a 'plan to produce nuclear weapons,' which Pyongyang claimed was part of its right to self-defense. [27]

The United States responded in December 2002 by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North Korea retaliated by lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring that freeze, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003. [28] Initially, North Korea claimed it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generating electricity.

2003 to 2006: New Crises, and the Beginning and End of the Six-Party Process

In early 2003, U.S. intelligence detected activities around the Radiochemisty Laboratory, a reprocessing facility in Yongbyon, which indicated that North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage pond. [29] In September 2003, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea had completed the reprocessing of this spent fuel—this would have given North Korea enough plutonium for approximately four to six nuclear devices. [30] In January 2004, a delegation of invited U.S. experts confirmed that the canisters in the temporary storage pond were empty. [31]

In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue began in Beijing with the aim of ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Initially trilateral in format (China, North Korea and the United States), the process expanded to a six-party format with the inclusion of Japan, Russia and South Korea. The first round began in August 2003. Six months later, in February 2004, the second round of talks was held, and a third round followed in June 2004. However, tensions between the parties—particularly the United States and North Korea—caused the talks to stall for more than a year, restarting in July 2005.

While the six-party process stagnated, North Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor in April 2005 and removed the spent fuel. [32] The reactor had been operating since February 2003, meaning that it could have produced enough plutonium for between one and three nuclear devices in its spent fuel. However, it would take a few months for North Korean engineers to extract the plutonium from the spent fuel rods. In July 2005, satellite imagery indicated that the reactor had begun operations once again. [33]

On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of Six-Party Talks concluded and the six parties signed a Statement of Principles, whereby North Korea would abandon its nuclear programs and return to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime at 'an early date.' The United States stated that it had no intention of attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons, and Washington affirmed that it had no nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The parties also agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibited uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, should be observed and implemented. [34]

Although hailed as a breakthrough by some participants, the viability of the Statement of Principles was immediately brought into question by North Korean and U.S. actions. The parties disagreed over the implications of the Statement of Principles for light water reactor transfers to North Korea. While Pyongyang argued that the six-party statement permitted LWR transfers, Washington countered that this was not guaranteed under the statement and could only occur after North Korea had dismantled its existing nuclear program. Shortly after signing the agreement in Beijing, the U.S. Treasury Department announced that U.S. financial institutions were barred from having correspondent accounts with Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macao-based bank, which it accused of assisting North Korea in illicit transactions. [35] North Korea asserted that unless the so-called “sanctions” were lifted, Pyongyang would not carry out its part of the September 2005 agreement. [36] Due to these and other disagreements, the Six-Party Talks stalemated, and the Statement of Principles remained dormant for more than 18 months.

2006 to 2011: A Nuclear Test, Failed Negotiations, and Another Nuclear Test

The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point in October when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test at 10:35AM (local time) at the Punggye-ri test site [37] The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that the test was conducted at a 'stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.' [38] The North Korean nuclear test did not, however, produce a significant yield. The yield from this test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton. North Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4 kiloton yield, possibly indicating that the North Korean plutonium program still had a number of technical hurdles to overcome before it would have a nuclear warhead. [39]

Immediately following the test, UNSC Resolution 1718 imposed sanctions on North Korea. [40] After intense diplomatic activities by the Chinese government and others involved in the Six-Party process, the parties met again in December 2006 following a hiatus of more than a year. However, these talks ended without any sign of progress. [41] In what appeared to be a breakthrough in the negotiations, the six parties in February 2007 agreed on the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, whereby North Korea agreed to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime in exchange for a package of incentives that included the provision of energy assistance to North Korea by the other parties. [42] The agreement also established a 60-day deadline during which North Korea was to shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision. Additionally, the United States agreed to release the approximately $25 million in North Korean assets held at the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA). [43] However, the BDA part of the agreement again became a sticking point; much of the international financial community, concerned about the possible legal ramifications of dealing with a bank that was technically still under U.S. sanctions, refused to take part in the transfer of the funds. The issue was eventually resolved when a Russian bank agreed to transfer the funds in June 2007. [44]

After the February 2007 agreement, North Korea extended invitations to IAEA officials, opening the door to reestablishing its relationship with the Agency. In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and sealing it main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision. [45] Further progress was made in the Six-Party Talks when the parties adopted the Second Action Plan, calling on North Korea to disable its main nuclear facilities and submit a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by 31 December 2007. [46] While disablement activities on North Korea's three key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon-kun (the 5MW(e) experimental reactor, the Radiochemistry Laboratory and the Fuel Fabrication Plant) progressed, North Korea failed to meet the 31 December deadline to submit its declaration. [47] Sharp disagreements over North Korea's past illicit procurement efforts and controversies surrounding suspected North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria proved to be the key sticking points.

Almost six months past the deadline, on 26 June 2008, North Korea submitted its much-awaited declaration. [48] While the contents of North Korea's declaration have not been disclosed to the public, various media reports claimed that the declaration failed to address both North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment program and suspicions of its nuclear cooperation with countries such as Syria. [49] Despite problems with the declarations, the Bush administration notified the U.S. Congress that it planned to remove North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and also issued a proclamation lifting some sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. [50] Following the U.S. government's actions, North Korea demolished the cooling tower at the Yongbyon 5MW(e) reactor, an event broadcast by international media. [51]

Delays with the U.S. removal of North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list contributed to North Korean delays in meeting its own commitments, and eventually Pyongyang announced in late August 2008 that it had restored the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon-kun, and barred international inspectors from accessing the site. [52] On 11 October 2008, the United States finally dropped North Korea from the terrorism list after reaching a deal in which North Korea agreed to resume the disabling of its nuclear facilities, and to allow inspectors access to the nuclear sites. [53] The six parties then resumed negotiations to map out a verification plan in Beijing in December 2008. These negotiations focused on ways to verify the disablement of North Korea's nuclear program, including taking nuclear samples. However, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement on a verification protocol, and the issue remains stalled. [54]

After a dispute over rocket launches in March 2009, North Korea kicked out IAEA and U.S. inspectors and began to rebuild the Yongbyon 5MW(e) reactor for the purpose of reprocessing plutonium from its spent fuel rods, in contravention of its previous promises at the Six-Party Talks. On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. KCNA announced that Pyongyang had carried out the nuclear test, and that it 'was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control.' [55] Initial estimates from the U.S. government showed the test causing seismic activity equivalent to an earthquake of magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter Scale, and was located close to the site of the first nuclear test in 2006. [56] The test was estimated to be about 4 kilotons. [57] The United Nations Security Council released Resolution 1874; in response Pyongyang announced that 'the processing of uranium enrichment will be commenced.' North Korea further indicated that it did not intend to return to the Six-Party Talks, and asserted that it would not be bound by agreements made earlier through this forum. [58]

Tensions continued to rise in 2010 and 2011. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il visited China three times within one year, each time indicating he was willing to proceed with denuclearization efforts; however, North Korea also engaged in several military confrontations with the South. [59] In March 2010, North Korea torpedoed a South Korean ship killing 46 sailors, and in November of the same year it shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing four South Koreans, including two civilians. [60] Additionally, in March 2010, North Korea announced the construction of a light-water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon. [61] U.S. nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed that construction for a 25-30MW(e) experimental LWR had commenced during his November 2010 visit. In November 2011 analysts estimated that the experimental LWR might be externally completed within the next year, but operations were unlikely to begin for another two to three years as machinery and equipment would need to be loaded and installed. [62] Additionally, Hecker reported that North Korea had completed the construction of a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon with 2,000 P-2 centrifuges in six cascades. [63] Although satellite imagery showed that activity had been halted since late April 2014, subsequent imagery from September 2015 showed new activity, likely indicating increased uranium production. [64]

On 15 March 2011, Pyongyang announced its willingness to return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions, and agreed to discuss its uranium enrichment program. [65] After the death of Kim Jong Il and ascension of Kim Jong Un to power in December 2011, the U.S. and North Korea held a series of bilateral talks. These talks culminated in the “Leap Day Agreement” of 29 February 2012, a moratorium on North Korean nuclear testing, uranium enrichment and long-range missile tests in exchange for food aid. [66] However, the U.S. withdrew its offer of food aid after North Korea attempted to launch a satellite into orbit using an Unha rocket on 12 April 2012. The U.S. considered the space launch to be a violation of the agreement. North Korea successfully launched an additional Unha rocket in December 2012, leading the UN Security Council to follow up with Resolution 2087 demanding North Korea end its nuclear and missile programs. [67]

2012-2016: Working on Miniaturization and a Thermonuclear Bomb

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted a third nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility. [68] The USGS reported a 5.1 magnitude seismic shock in the vicinity of the test site. [69] North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a 'lighter, miniaturized atomic bomb.' [70]

In April 2013, North Korean state media announced that Pyongyang was restarting its 5MW graphite-moderated reactor and uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon. [71] Though the original cooling tower was demolished in 2008, satellite analysis confirmed activity consistent with connecting cooling pipes from the 5MW reactor to the adjacent river. [72] By August 2013, satellite imagery confirmed steam venting from the reactor's turbine and generator building. [73] Meanwhile, the external work on the adjacent experimental light water reactor appears to have concluded based on January 2014 satellite imagery; however, the reactor is likely not yet fully operational. [74]

In March 2014, KCNA announced the DPRK's intention to conduct a 'new form' of nuclear testing, and September 2015 commercial satellite imagery indicated increased activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. [75]

In December 2015, according to state-run Rodong Sinmun, Kim Jong Un claimed that North Korea possessed thermonuclear capabilities during his visit to the Pyongchon Revolutionary Site. This claim was met with wide skepticism from the international community. [76] On 6 January 2016 North Korea announced it had successfully tested a thermonuclear device at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. [77] The test registered as a 5.1 magnitude earthquake according to the USGS; given that the magnitude was similar to the 2013 test, most experts believe that North Korea tested a fission device similar in yield to the 2013 test instead of a thermonuclear device as it had claimed. [78] [79] Some have also speculated that North Korea actually tested a miniaturized version of the 2013 device instead of a boosted fission device. [80] No conclusive radionuclide readings have been provided. The test was met with widespread international criticism and led to further sanctions being imposed by the United Nations in March 2016. On 9 March 2016, North Korea released photographs depicting Kim Jong Un examining what the DPRK claims is a miniaturized nuclear implosion device in front of several partially assembled KN-08 mod 1 and mod 2 missiles. [81] Six days later, on 15 March 2016, North Korea announced its intention to conduct another nuclear test. [82] North Korea later announced in August what U.S. experts had long suspected, that it had restarted reprocessing spent fuel rods, creating more plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. [83]

On 9 September 2016, North Korea carried out its fifth nuclear test to coincide with the 68^th anniversary of the founding of North Korea. [84] The U.S. Geological Survey registered the test as a 5.3 magnitude earthquake. [85] Shortly afterwards, North Korea released a defiant statement warning its 'enemies' that it now has the capability to produce a warhead small enough to fit onto the end of a missile and can retaliate against any attack. [86] Experts remain unsure about the exact yield of the explosion. The yield appears to be larger than all previous tests carried out by the regime, with most estimates placing the yield between 10 and 20 kilotons. [87] The test drew sharp international condemnation; in a statement issued by the White House, President Obama condemned the test and stated that the regime's actions have only added to the instability of the region. [88] Even China, North Korea's only major ally, condemned the test and called on North Korea to refrain from provocative acts. [89] At an emergency meeting following the 9 September test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 on 30 November 2016. [90]

Recent Developments and Current Status

In a speech marking the beginning of 2017, Kim Jong-un emphasized the advancement of North Korea’s missile and nuclear program in his outlined goals for North Korea. [91] In contrast to his 2016 address, Kim made explicit mention of nuclear tests, noting the (allegedly) successful hydrogen bomb test of September 2016, as well as claiming that North Korea was entering the “final stage of preparation for the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).” [92]

2017 saw significant developments in the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as blustery rhetoric between North Korea and U.S. President Donald Trump. On 3 July 2017, North Korea tested the Hwasong-14 ballistic missile, which the United States later confirmed to be an ICBM. [93] On 8 August 2017, a leaked U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report found that North Korea had produced miniaturized nuclear warheads capable of fitting on an ICBM. [94] On the same day, in response to North Korean criticism of the United States, President Trump told reporters that if North Korea made further nuclear threats against the United States “they will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.' [95]

On 3 September 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test at Punggye-ri. [96] According to initial U.S. intelligence assessments, the test released 140 kilotons of TNT equivalent, making it larger in explosive yield than the previous five tests combined. [97] Other analysts, using satellite imagery and seismic data, estimated an even higher explosive yield, perhaps as much as 250 kilotons. [98] North Korea claimed that the test was of a thermonuclear warhead, and immediately before the test released photographs of Kim Jong-un inspecting a “peanut-shaped” nuclear device resembling a Teller-Ulam design hydrogen bomb. [99] U.S. intelligence officials classified the test as an “advanced nuclear device.” [100] Following the successful test-flight of the Hwasong-15 ICBM in November 2017, North Korea announced that it had “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force.” [101]

Subsequent months saw a diplomatic thaw between North and South Korea, as newly-elected South Korean president Moon Jae-in pursued a policy of openness toward the North and athletes from the two Koreas marched under a unified flag at the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games. On 27 April, the two leaders held a summit meeting in the demilitarized zone, the first such meeting since 2007. In a joint statement released after the summit, they “confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” [102] Additionally, North Korea sought to ease nuclear tensions by declaring a halt to all nuclear and ICBM tests, and pledging to close a nuclear test site. [103] On 24 May 2018, North Korea closed the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, destroying underground tunnels and surface facilities in front of an audience that included Western journalists. [104]

Softening relations between North and South Korea also helped facilitate an opening for diplomacy with the United States, which culminated in the 12 June 2018 summit meeting between Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump in Singapore, marking the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of North Korea and the United States in history. The summit resulted in a joint declaration and claims of success from both parties, as Trump and Kim agreed to “establish new US-DPRK relations,” “build a lasting stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula,” including Kim’s agreement to “work towards complete denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.” [105] Trump also mentioned his desire to end US-South Korean military exercises and eventually remove troops from South Korea in a post-summit news conference. [106]

The summit has not yielded substantive plans for denuclearization, and, despite President Trump’s claim on 13 June 2018 that “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea,” the country still possesses a considerable nuclear arsenal and long-range ballistic missile systems. The July 2018 revelation of the existence of a covert uranium enrichment site at Kangson suggests that North Korea is still concealing nuclear sites from the international community, which complicates any nuclear deal making. [107] Experts have cautioned against interpreting North Korean statements, which are supportive of denuclearization in principle, as Pyongyang being prepared to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Leading North Korea expert Jeffrey Lewis argues that Kim’s statements instead suggest a willingness to “engage in a process, headed toward an ambiguous goal.” [108]

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[14] Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 279; 'March Letter and Memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN Security Council,' United Nations Security Council Document, 17 March 1993, pp. 1-10.
[15] Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 280; Gamini Seneviratne, 'IAEA Struggling to Stand Firm and Find Face-Saver for North Korea,' Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p. 10; 'Letter from Kim Yong-nam, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs,' 12 March 1993; David E. Sanger, 'West Knew of North Korea Nuclear Development,' The New York Times, 13 March 1993, p. 3.
[16] R. Jeffrey Smith, 'N. Korea Won't Quit Nuclear Ban Treaty; Inspection of Two Key Sites Still Rejected,' Washington Post, 12 June 1993, p. A1; Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286; J. T. Nguyen, 'North Korea Postpones Decision to Abandon Nuclear Treaty,' United Press International, 11 June 1993; John Wright, 'North Korea Remains in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,' Associated Press, 12 June 1993.
[17] Eric Schmitt, 'U.S. Delays Taking Steps Over A-Plant,' The New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp. A1 and A3; David E. Sanger, 'North Koreans Say Nuclear Fuel Rods Are Being Removed,' The New York Times, 15 May 1994.
[18] David E. Sanger, 'North Korea Foils Efforts to Halt Its Nuclear Plans,' The New York Times, 29 May 1994; Paul Lewis, 'UN Told North Korea's Nuclear Record Can't Be Retrieved,' The New York Times, 4 June 1994, p. A3.
[19] Terence Hunt, 'U.S. to Seek UN Sanctions against North Korea,' Associated Press, 2 June 1994; Michael R. Gordon, 'White House Asks Global Sanctions on North Koreans,' The New York Times, 3 June 1994; Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 3 June 1994, in 'Vice Foreign Minister's Statement on U.S.-Orchestrated Pressure on Nuclear Issue,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
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[21] 'Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,' 21 October 1994, via www.kedo.org; David E. Sanger, 'Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans,' The New York Times, 19 October 1994, p. A1; 'Secret Annex to U.S.-North Korea Agreement,' Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 October 1994; Michael R. Gordon, 'U.S.-North Korea Accord Has a 10-Year Timetable,' The New York Times, 21 October 1994, p. A8; Alan Riding, 'U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute,' The New York Times, 22 October 1994, p. A5; 'N. Korea's Pledge on Graphite-Moderated Reactors Cited,' Japan Economic Newswire, 14 January 1999; Takashi Uemura, 'N. Korea's Concession Revealed,' Asahi News Service, 10 May 1999.
[22] Alex Wagner, 'Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,' Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23 and 25; Michael Knapik, 'U.S. to Pursue Better Execution of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework,' Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No 24, 14 June 2001.
[23] Stephen Fidler and Edward Luce, 'U.S. Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability through Pakistan,' Financial Times, 1 June 2001, p. 1; 'Pakistan Denies Export of Nuclear Technology,' Japan Economic Newswire, 5 June 2001.
[24] 'Father of Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb Removed,' Deutsche Presse Agentur, 31 January 2004; 'Founder of Pakistan's Nuke Program Sacked as Advisor,' Kyodo News Service, 31 January 2004; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, 'Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,' The Washington Post, 24 January 2004.
[25] Ankit Panda, “Exclusive: Revealing Kangson, North Korea’s First Covert Uranium Enrichment Site,” The Diplomat, 13 July 2018, www.thediplomat.com.
[26] 'U.S. Special Envoy Leaves Pyongyang,' Xinhua News Agency, 5 October 2002.
[27] Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, 'North Korean Nuclear Program,' U.S. Department of State, 16 October 2002, www.state.gov; James A. Kelly, 'U.S.-East Asia Policy: Three Aspects,' Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 11 December 2002, www.state.gov; 'Spokesman for DPRK FM on DPRK Visit of Special Envoy of U.S. President,' KCNA, 7 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; '미국 대통령 특사는 심히 압력적이고 오만하게 나왔다. / 조선외무성 대변인 [U.S. Presidential Envoy was Arrogant and Pressured Us. / Representatives of DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affair],' KCNA, 7 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.
[28] Carol Giacomo, 'U.S. Says N. Korean Fuel Oil Deliveries Should End,' Reuters, 13 November 2002, www.reuters.com; P.S. Suryanarayana, 'IAEA Inspectors Leave N. Korea,' The Hindu, 1 January 2003; 'Statement of DPRK Government on Its Withdrawal from NPT,' KCNA, 10 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.
[29] 'Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia,' Speech by William Perry, Brookings Institution, 24 January 2003.
[30] David E. Sanger, 'North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel from Atom Bombs,” The New York Times, 15 July 2003, www.nytimes.com; Jong-Heon Lee, 'Analysis: N. Korea's Nuke Game Going Further,' United Press International, 2 October 2003.
[31] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on 'Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,' Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 21 January 2004, Committee Hearings 108th Congress Second Session — 2004, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://foreign.senate.gov; Barbara Slavin, 'Scientist Describes N. Korea Nuclear Evidence,' USA Today, 22 January 2004.
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[33] 'Report: North Korea Restarted Nuclear Reactor Before International Nuclear Talks,' Associated Press Worldstream, 21 August 2005.
[34] 'North Korea Agrees to Abandon Nuclear Weapons Program,' U.S. Fed News, 19 September 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.
[35] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Finalizes Rule against Banco Delta Asia BDA Cut off from U.S. Financial System,” 14 March 2007, www.treasury.gov.
[36] 'Nuclear Talks Suspended Indefinitely: Korea,' Agence France-Presse, 11 December 2005.
[37] 'Magnitude 4.3 — North Korea,' USGS, 9 October 2006, http://earthquake.usgs.gov.
[38] 'DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,' KCNA, 10 October 2006, www.kcna.co.jp.
[39] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 'Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test,' 11 October 2009, www.dni.gov; Siegfried S. Hecker, 'Denuclearizing North Korea,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008, http://iisdb.stanford.edu; Siegfried S. Hecker, 'Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,' Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 15 November 2006.
[40] Warren Hoge, 'Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea,' The New York Times, 15 October 2006, www.nytimes.com; Philip Sherwell, 'UN Vote Slaps Sanctions on North Korea,' Sunday Telegraph, 15 October 2006.
[41] 'Nuclear Talks with N. Korea End in Failure; Six-Party Process Thrown into Doubt,' Washington Post, 23 December 2006, www.washingtonpost.com.
[42] Audra Ang, 'North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Disarmament,' Associated Press, 13 February 2005.
[43] Audra Ang, 'North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Disarmament,' Associated Press, 13 February 2005; Christopher Bodeen, 'U.S., North Korea Resolve Macau Bank Dispute as Six-Party Talks Begin,' Associated Press, 19 March 2007.
[44] 'Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Solution to Issue of Frozen Funds,' KCNA, 25 June 2007, www.kcna.co.jp; 'North Korea Says its Banking Row with Washington Resolved,' Associated Press, 25 June 2007.
[45] Jae-Soon Chang, 'UN Inspectors Verify All N. Korea Nuclear Facilities Closed Beyond Reactor,' Associated Press, 18 July 2007.
[46] 'Deadline For Disabling N.K. Nukes Set At Year-End,' Korea Herald, 4 October 2007.
[47] Choe Sang Hun and Steven Lee Myers, 'North Korea Says It Met Nuclear Disclosure Deadline in Previous Declaration,' The New York Times, 5 January 2008; Blaine Harden, 'All Nuclear Efforts Disclosed, N. Korea Says; U.S. Calls Pyongyang's Declaration Incomplete but Says Negotiations Will Continue,' The Washington Post, 5 January 2008; Paul Richter, 'N. Korea Says It Has Met Nuclear Criteria; U.S. Officials Say a Full List of Activities Has Not Been Produced,' Los Angeles Times, 5 January 2008.
[48] 'USA Hails North Korea Nuclear List - Yonhap,' in BBC Monitoring, 26 June 2008.
[49] Glenn Kessler, 'U.S. Ready to Ease Sanctions on N. Korea; Pyongyang Would Have to Acknowledge Evidence About Nuclear Activities,' Washington Post, 11 April 2008.
[50] Norimitsu Onishi and Edward Wong, 'U.S. to Remove North Koreans from Terror List; Nuclear Declaration is Rewarded as Disarmament Effort Advances,' International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2008.
[51] 'N. Korea Destroys Reactor Cooling Tower,' Korea Times, 27 June 2008.
[52] Choe Sang-Hun, 'North Korea Says It Stopped Disabling Nuclear Complex,' The New York Times, 27 August 2008.
[53] Glenn Kessler, 'U.S. Drops North Korea from Terrorism List,' The Washington Post, 12 October 2008.
[54] Jin Dae-Woong, 'Nuke Envoys Fail to Narrow Gaps over Verification Pact,' The Korea Herald, 9 December 2008.
[55] 'KCNA Report on One More Successful Underground Nuclear Test,' KCNA, 25 May 2009, www.kcna.co.jp.
[56] 'Magnitude 4.7 — North Korea,' USGS, 25 May 2009, http://earthquake.usgs.gov.
[57] 'Next Phase in the Analysis of the Announced DPRK Nuclear Test,' CTBTO, 27 May 2009, www.ctbto.org.
[58] 'North Korea To Push Ahead With Uranium Enrichment,' Asia Pulse, 15 June 2009.
[59] 'Kim Vows to Work on Return to N. Korea Nuclear Talks: Xinhua,' Agence France-Presse, 7 May 2010; 'DPRK Top Leader Kim Jong-il Hopes for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks,' Xinhua, 30 August 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com; Haksoon Paik, “Kim Jong Il’s Visit to China: Implications for East Asia and the United States,” 38 North, 5 June 2011, http://38north.org.
[60] Victor Cha, 'The Sinking of the Cheonan,' Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 April 2010, http://csis.org; Hyung-jin Kim and Kwang-tae Kim, 'North Korean Shelling Killed 4, Gutted Homes,' Associated Press, 24 November 2010; Seo Yoonjung and Keith B. Richburg, “Two Civilians Killed in North Korean Artillery Attack” Washington Post, 24 November 2010, www.washingtonpost.com.
[61] 'KCNA on Despicable Inside Story about Megaphone War,' KCNA, 29 March 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; 'N. Korea to Build Light Water Reactor Soon: State Media,' Agence France-Presse, 29 March 2010.
[62] “North Korea Makes Significant Progress in Building New Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR),” 38 North, 14 November 2011, www.38north.org.
[63] Siegfried S. Hecker, 'A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,' Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, http://iis-db.stanford.edu.
[64] 'Light Water Reactor Construction Progressing at Yongbyon Nuclear Site,' ISIS Report, March 5, 2012, http://isis-online.org; Jack Liu, 'North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: All Quiet for the Moment,' 38 North, August 11, 2014, http://38north.org; Jeffrey Lewis, “Recent Imagery Suggests Increased Uranium Production in North Korea,” 38 North, 12 August 2015, www.38north.org.
[65] 'North Korea 'Ready to Discuss Nuclear Enrichment',' BBC, 15 March 2011, www.bbc.com.
[66] Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang-hun, “North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S. to Give Aid,” New York Times, 29 February 2012, www.nytimes.com.
[67] Evan Ramstad and Laura Meckler, 'North Korean Launch Fails,' The Wall Street Journal, 13 April 2012, http://online.wsj.com.
[68] David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, 'North Korea Confirms It Conducted 3rd Nuclear Test,' New York Times, 12 February 2013, www.nytimes.com.
[69] 'M5.1 - 23km ENE of Sungjibaegam, North Korea,' U.S. Geological Survey, 12 February 2013, http://earthquake.usgs.gov.
[70] '제3차 지하핵시험을 성공적으로 진행 [Third Underground Nuclear Test Conducted Successfully],' KCNA, 12 February 2013, www.kcna.kp.
[71] “DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities,” KCNA, 2 April 2013, www.kcna.co.jp.
[72] Nick Hansen and Jeffrey Lewis, “Satellite Images Show New Construction at North Korea’s Plutonium Production Reactor; Rapid Restart?' 38 North, 3 April 2013, http://38north.org; David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Monitoring Activity at Yongbyon Nuclear Site,” ISIS Reports, 23 April 2014, http://isis-online.org.
[73] Nick Hansen and Jeffrey Lewis, “Update on Yongbyon,” 38 North, 11 September 2013, http://38north.org.
[74] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Mike Eley, Jack Liu and Frank V. Pabian, “North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,” 38 North, 14 July 2017, http://38north.org.
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[76] 'Kim Jong Un Visits Reconstructed Pyongchon Revolutionary Site,' Rodong Sinmun, 10 December 2015, rodong.rep.kp.
[77] David E Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says It Has Detonated Its First Hydrogen Bomb,” The New York Times, 5 January 2016, www.nytimes.com.
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Reasons For North Korea S Nuclear Program

Get the Facts on North Korea

Korea S Nuclear Program 2007 Sienna Miller

• Conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017
• Not party to the CWC and believed to possess 2,500-5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons
• Active exporter of ballistic missile components, technology, and design data